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Abstract
This paper proposes an alternative model for capture that it is not based on reciprocity
but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged
by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only
the firm can observe its type and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide
a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self-enforcing
equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, saves information gathering
cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
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Regulatory capture is an area that has attracted considerable attention from both academia
and practitioners in legal and organizational contexts. Generally, the notion that an agency
monitoring a sector in order to prevent abuse of market power or to insure non-discriminatory
service provision, is unduly influenced by the very firms that it is set to supervise is per se
a justified motivation to scrutinize regulatory design.
Capture is often analyzed using a three-layer hierarchy composed of a political principal
(government), a regulatory agency and an industry or a firm. Regulatory capture is then a
side agreement between the regulator and the firm to act against the interests of the political
principal.1 When the regulatory environment is designed under asymmetric information,
capture originates in the combination of regulatory discretion and information rents left to
the firm (Tirole, 1986; Laffont and Tirole 1993, chapter 11).
In most capture models, the firm influences the regulatory behavior by a mechanism
based on threats2 (damaged reputation) or rewards (bribes, revolving doors); see Dal Bó
(2006) for a recent survey. Capture here is based on an exchange of favors between the regu-
lator and the regulated firm. The regulator leaves extra rents to the firm, for instance by not
disclosing valuable information or by lenient enforcement of regulations. In return, the firm
or the industry offers a bribe3 or the possibility of post-regulatory employment in a regulated
firm (revolving doors). Taking the possibility of capture into account, the government op-
timally limits the regulatory discretion (Hiriart and Martimort, 2012) and/or decentralizes
its objective to the regulator who is then accountable for the regulatory outcome.
1In the general setting, capture may be induced not only by the regulated firm, but also by clients, staff
or other stakeholders having interests in rent extraction (see Peltzman, 1976 and Becker, 1983).
2Dal Bó and Di Tella’s model (2003), is one of very few including the threat of punishment (violence,
harassment or slander) to capture the regulator.
3Estache and Wren Lewis (2011) address open corruption problems associated with sector regulation in
developing countries, e.g. the payment of maritime liner registration fees in cash in Liberia. Although such
open money transfers tend to be rare in the Western Hemisphere, the firm may organize the side payment
more discreetly. Regulated firms may e.g. provide contracts for services to firms associated with the civil
servant (regulator) or with members of his family, provide valuable private information on traded assets or
foreseen business projects, real estate or other (costly) indirect transfers.
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According to this classical view, we should observe either capture of regulators by special
interest groups or a regulatory design that prevents capture.
Empirical support for monetary corruption is scarce and mostly inconclusive, possibly
owing to lack of data and imperfect proxies. Contributions such as those of Dal Bó and Rossi
(2007), Kenny (2009), Estache et al. (2009) and Berg et al. (2012) all show coincidences
between various indicators of regulatory dysfunction and the prevalence of corruption in
certain countries (often developing countries), but the link of causality to regulatory bribery
has not been established. Alternative hypotheses, such as corruption affecting other stages of
the production or the administration could yield similar outcomes without primarily relying
on the regulator. Anecdotal evidence in Europe and the USA does not suggest that bribery
of regulators is a widespread practice nor that it would be increasing with the number of
regulatory authorities.
The “revolving door” hypothesis also has a disputed empirical support (Eckert, 1981,
Freitag, 1983, Cohen, 1986, and Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992)4 but mechanisms do exist to
limit the porosity between firms and regulators, e.g. ethical commissions that try to avoid
conflict of interests for civil servants.5
Finally, to our knowledge, few regulators are directly (economically) accountable for
regulatory outcomes.6 Most regulators are civil servants with fixed salaries that are publicly
known and operating under restrictions concerning complementary economic activities. We
thus have a paradox of capture: the existence is widely acknowledged but evidence is scarce
(Agrell and Gautier, 2012).
4Although more lenient applications of regulatory monitoring and empathy towards regulated entities are
prevalent among low- and medium-level staff members of regulatory authorities, only a small fraction seeks or
obtains employment in the regulated sector. However, Makkai and Braithwaite (1992) document “situational
capture” as a consequence of the extra workload caused by higher incidence of detected non-compliance. In
our setting, this can be interpreted as a problem of moral hazard linked to the cost of effort in enforcement.
5Some jurisdictions operate with disclosure rules or “cooling-off” periods for the taking up of employment
in regulated firms. However, Heyes (2003) shows with a model that this practice may be ineffective in terms
of welfare when regulators act strategically to increase their market value through complexity in regulation.
6Henderson and Tung (2012) show that even with the recent introduction of “performance-based” salary
scales for (banking) regulators in the US, the amounts remain modest and the award is largely based on ex
post discretionary assessment by the political principal.
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In this paper, we consider another mechanism for influencing the regulatory rule-making
and implementation: regulated firms can transmit pieces of information relevant to the
decision makers. Indeed, many regulated firms finance R&D, produced in-house or by third
parties, and disseminate the results of these studies. This knowledge can be (and actually
is) used for regulatory purposes for the benefit of both the regulator and the firm: the
regulator because it saves on information gathering costs and the firm because it controls the
content of the information. Thus, the regulator is captured by accepting biased information
from the firm. We refer to this situation as soft capture and we believe that this form of
capture is quite common in regulated industries. In technical infrastructure regulation such
as transport, energy, water and telecommunication, the regulator may be subject to political
pressure to present new technical regulation for specific service dimensions7 (e.g. technical
or service quality norms, cost allocation schemes, grid codes) within a given time and budget
frame. Facing the risk of professional failure in the case an inadequate regulation is presented
and the risk of career concerns if refusing the task, the regulators may have private career
incentives to accept industry “input” , “sector consultations” or “cooperative development”
of such regulatory projects.8
Models based on information provision as incentive for capture are relatively rare. In
a stream addressing lobbying of vote-seeking political principals, Austen-Smith and Wright
(1992) present a model where two competing interest groups invest in biased information
transmission subject to the possibility of costly auditing from the principal. The results
show that on average the information provision is welfare increasing and that the presence
7Note that we here refer to “capture of decisions” as opposed to “capture of (accounting) information” in
Estache and Wren Lewis (2011) or capture of “regulatory substance” as opposed to “regulatory governance”
in Berg et al. (2012). Thus an industry-financed study on service quality providing data on willingness to
pay is likely not intended for direct use in implementation (although this occurs, cf. Agrell and Gautier,
2012), but to influence the regulator in the choice of relevant metrics of quality provision. Analogously
in occupational safety regulation, the submission of technical assessments for the costs and effectiveness of
particular worker protection measures (Agrell and Gautier, 2012) is not aimed at the ruling for a particular
firm but at the very definition of relevant thresholds for the imposition of such measures across firms.
8The origin of the information may also be obscured through the use of consultants, sponsored interest
groups and think-tanks, blurring the information about which stakeholder is trying to influence the decision.
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of multiple information providers may discipline the tendency to distort information.9
Soft capture is not based on threats and rewards: both parties are better off if the
regulator recycles the information produced by the firm rather than producing his own. The
regulator provides the political principal with information in compliance with the expected
outcome by the principal. And, as it transmits less precise information, the firm increases
its information rent. Hence, the capture benefits both parties without requiring any form of
side contracting or side payments between parties. Thus, there is no smoking gun when the
regulator is softly captured by the firm.
In this paper, we develop a formal model of soft capture in a three-tier hierarchy. Our
main result is to show that the principal may tolerate (soft) capture at equilibrium.10 Regard-
ing this, two conditions should be satisfied: first, the information provided to the principal
by the regulator should be “soft” rather than “hard” information. If the information is veri-
fiable, any possible bias will be immediately detected and soft capture would not be an issue.
This implies that soft capture is more a concern when the regulator is asked to develop a
methodology for conducting regulations (a typical example of soft information) than when
it is asked to apply a specific regulation. Second, the information received by the principal
should remain sufficiently informative. Absent this condition, the principal would no longer
maintain a costly intermediate for transmitting pure noise. Messages remain informative ei-
ther if the firm does not systematically send them or if the regulator does not always accept
them. In one of these cases, information remains valuable even it contains some noise or bias
introduced by the firm and adding an intermediate remains justified.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the baseline model. Section III
describes the benchmark contract in the absence of capture. Section IV introduces the
possibility of soft capture. Section V considers capture-proof contracts. Some extensions are
9In our model, the regulator is the sole source of information for the political principal. Dual sourcing of
information, e.g. lobbying by the firm and reporting by the regulator, is not considered here. See Laffont
and Martimort (1998) on this point.
10Likewise, Che (1995) found that under some circumstances tolerated capture might be the preferred
outcome.
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discussed in Section VI and Section VII concludes.
II The model
We consider a three-tier hierarchy composed of a political principal, a regulatory agency and
an agent. The agent is a regulated industry that we model as a representative firm. The
production of the firm is regulated by the political principal who offers the firm a contract
specifying a production level and a transfer. As in classical models of incentive regulation, we
assume that the regulated industry has some private information on its cost of production.
The political principal then designs an optimal incentive contract à la Baron and Myerson
(1982). Because of asymmetric information, the contract is only a second-best contract and
the firm enjoys information rents that are costly for the principal. To limit these rents, the
principal appoints an intermediate, the regulator11, whose main task consists in filling in the
information gap between the firm and the political principal. To this end, the regulator is
asked to produce a cost assessment report for the political principal. The delegation of the
monitoring task may be justified by the lack of competency or time by the political princi-
pal. This additional piece of information on the firm’s hidden cost parameter improves the
contract by limiting the information rents left to the firm.
Firm
The representative firm produces a good in quantity q at a constant marginal cost θ. The
cost parameter is the firm’s private information but it is common knowledge that θ ∈ {θ, θ},
with ∆θ = θ − θ > 0 and Pr(θ = θ) = ν. The firm signs a contract with the political
principal that specifies the production level q and a transfer t. The firm’s utility is:
U = t− θq. (1)
11Following the convention, the political principal is denoted “she” and the regulator “he” .
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The firm’s reservation utility is normalized to zero.
Regulator
The regulator is requested to provide the political principal with a signal σ. A signal is
a piece of information correlated with the firm’s hidden cost parameter. Analogous to the
cost parameter θ, the signal is a binary variable σ ∈ {σ1, σ2}. The signal σ = σ1 (resp.
σ2) -if correctly interpreted (see below)- increases the probability of facing an efficient (resp.
inefficient) agent compared to the prior. We measure the informativeness of the signal
produced by the regulator by the conditional probability µ = Pr(σ = σ1|θ = θ) = Pr(σ =
σ2|θ = θ).12 When µ increases, the correlation between the firm’s true type θ and the signal
increases. With µ = 1, the signal and the type are perfectly correlated while µ = 1/2 signifies
a white noise.
The production of the signal is costly for the regulator. To produce a signal of quality
µ, the regulator must incur a cost m > 0. The signal is useful to the principal to revise
her prior beliefs regarding the firm’s cost, thereby reducing the costly rents left to the
firm.13 We assume that the signal is soft information, meaning that the contract between the
principal and the firm cannot be made contingent on the realization of the signal. However,
the potential disclosure of information by the regulator is observable and the regulator’s
compensation can be made contingent on that.14 Thus, the political principal cannot verify
the quality of an assessment but merely its existence.
The regulator and the political principal sign a contract specifying that, conditional on
submitting a signal, the regulator receives a payment w. In this case, the regulator’s utility
is:
V = w −m. (2)
12For notational simplicity, we study a symmetric informativeness leaving the case of asymmetric precision
for further work.
13Our model thus is a standard model of regulation under asymmetric information with ex-ante non
verifiable signals (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2).
14Examples could be cost, impact or efficiency studies performed by or for the regulator and included in
reports or preambles to regulatory rulings.
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The regulator has a reservation utility of zero and he is protected by limited liability.
Political principal
The political principal remains in charge of the main regulatory tasks and designs a regulatory
contract (t, q). When the firm produces a quantity q, the value for the principal of these q
units is S(q) with S ′ > 0, S ′′ < 0 and S(0) = 0. The principal’s net surplus15, W , is defined
as
W = S(q)− t− w. (3)
Timing of the events
• The firm learns its private cost parameter θ.
• The political principal offers a contract (w) to the regulator for the delivery of a signal
σ.
• The regulator produces a signal σ at cost m.
• The political principal observes σ and offers a contract (t, q) to the firm.
• The firm accepts or rejects the contract and production takes place.
III Benchmark results in the absence of capture
We solve the game recursively, starting with the contract design by the principal.
After observing the signal transmitted by the regulator, the principal revises her prior
beliefs on the firm’s private cost parameter. Given the informativeness of the signal µ, the
conditional probabilities of facing a type θ after observing the signal σi, i = 1, 2 are updated
15We assume that the political principal attributes no value to the utility of the regulator, a conventional
assumption.
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to (using the Bayes’ rule)
ν1 = Pr(θ = θ|σ1) = µν
µν + (1− µ)(1− ν) ≥ ν, (4)
ν2 = Pr(θ = θ|σ2) = (1− µ)ν
(1− µ)ν + µ(1− ν) ≤ ν. (5)
Signals are informative in the sense that the probability of facing the efficient type θ after
observing the signal σ1 (resp. σ2) is higher (resp. lower) than the priors. Furthermore, a










((1− µ)ν + µ(1− ν))2 < 0. (6)
Given its posterior beliefs, the optimal contracts offered by the principal after observing
the signal σi are obtained as the solution of:
max
{(ti,qi);(ti,qi)}
νi(S(qi)− ti) + (1− νi)(S(qi)− ti), (7)
subject to the firm’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints:
ti − θqi ≥ ti − θqi, (8)
ti − θqi ≥ 0. (9)
Solving the problem we obtain the optimal second-best contracts:
S ′(q
i
) = θ, (10)
S ′(qi) = θ +
νi
1− νi∆θ, (11)
ti = θqi + ∆θqi, (12)
ti = θqi. (13)
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The optimal quantity transfer pairs result from a well-known tradeoff between efficiency and
rent extraction, i.e. the quantity produced by the high cost firm is distorted downward to
reduce the rents left to the low cost firm while the quantity produced by the efficient firm is




= q = S ′−1(θ).
The distortions applied to the production of a high cost firm depend on the observed
signal. After observing σ1, the principal concludes that the probability of facing an efficient
agent is higher than her prior and the optimal contract calls for a stronger reduction in q1
to lower the information rent. On the contrary, after observing σ2, the principal considers
that it is more likely to face an inefficient agent and the optimal contract calls for a smaller
reduction in q2. In other words, we have q1 < q2.
We are now in the position to derive the information rents (U) and the expected welfare
(W˜ ) resulting from the optimal contract with the agent. For the purposes of comparative
statics, we will explicitly express them as functions of the informativeness parameter µ.
The firm’s information rent is equal to:
U(µ) = µ∆θq1 + (1− µ)∆θq2. (14)












The first term in (15) is negative (q1 < q2), the second term is negative (∂q1/∂µ < 0) and
the last term is positive (∂q2/∂µ > 0). If µ is sufficiently large then the information rent
unambiguously decreases with µ. In the sequel, we will assume that U decreases with the
informativeness of the signal for all relevant values of µ.
Assumption 1 ∂U/∂µ < 0 for all µ ∈ [1/2, 1].
Assumption 1 implies that a more informative signal always reduces the rents left to the
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regulated firm. In Appendix A, we show that S ′′′ ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for Assumption
1.
The expected welfare (evaluated at the optimal contract) is given by:
W˜ (µ) = ν[S(q)− θq − U(µ)]
+(1− ν)[µ(S(q2)− θq2) + (1− µ)(S(q1)− θq1)]. (16)
The following Lemma characterizes the impact on the welfare evaluated at the optimal
contract of a change in the informativeness of the signal.
Lemma 1 The function W˜ (µ) is increasing and convex in µ.
See Appendix A for a formal proof.
Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 imply that a more informative signal benefits the principal
but hurts the firm. This conflict naturally creates the scope for capture.
Moving one step back in the game, the welfare is equal to W˜ (µ) if the principal received
a signal σ from the regulator. As a signal is produced at cost m, the principal must offer
a compensation w ≥ m to the regulator for getting a signal. Setting w = m, the principal
obtains a signal and the total surplus is W˜ (µ)−m.
As an alternative, the principal can set w < m in which case the regulator does not
produce any signal. The firm is then offered a contract based on the priors. As for µ = 1/2,
ν1 = ν2 = ν, the optimal contract in the absence of signal is given by Equations (10) to (13)
evaluated at µ = 1/2. Thus if the principal sets w = 0, the regulator is abolished, no signal
is produced and the corresponding welfare is W˜ (1/2).
Adding a tier between the political principal and the firm is socially valuable whenever
W˜ (µ) − m ≥ W˜ (1/2). In the following Lemma, we derive the conditions under which a
regulator is socially valuable. Figure 1 illustrates the Lemma.
Lemma 2 If W˜ (1) − W˜ (1/2) ≥ m, there exists a µ˜1 ∈ [1/2, 1] such that if µ ≥ µ˜1, the
principal sets w = m and the regulator produces a signal; otherwise it sets w = 0 and does
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not observe a signal.
The principal employs a regulator when the gains from a more accurate information on
the firm’s cost parameter exceeds the cost of gathering information. For the remaining of













Figure 1: Welfare in the absence of capture
IV Soft capture
The scope for capture
The mechanism above is not immune to capture when the firm can substitute the regulator
and produce a signal σ by itself. Suppose that the firm can, with some probability x produce
a signal that is less informative than the signal produced by the regulator. If offered the
information for free, the regulator can transmit the signal to the political principal, receiving
the payment w = m since the principal cannot distinguish the origin or precision of the signal.
Given that the production cost is lower, the regulator’s utility is strictly higher: V = m.
The firm also benefits from providing the signal to the regulator. Consider for instance a
signal that is pure noise, corresponding to µ = 1/2. If the political principal is made to
believe that the signal has been produced by the regulatory agency, the expected rent of the
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firm with type θ is equal to:
∆θ
2
(q1 + q2) > U(µ). (17)
The implicit collusion between the firm and the regulator above is in contrast with other
models of collusion in three-tier hierarchies (Tirole, 1986, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, chapter
11, Kofman and Lawaree, 1993) where side contracting and side payments (or some form of
reciprocity) are necessary conditions for collusion. In these latter models, the firm should
bribe the regulator for not disclosing information that is valuable to the principal but detri-
mental to the firm. By contrast with soft capture, there is no need for an explicit agreement
to support collusion. The mechanism is self-enforcing and undetectable and its apparent lack
of commitment deceptive.
In practice, there are many channels that the firm can use to disclose (noisy or biased)
information to the regulator.16 Firms can produce their own research, data collection and
analyses or finance third parties (consultants, researchers, universities,...). These studies or
research reports, produced or sponsored by firms, may be disseminated through professional
forums, conferences or published as reports. Firms can also train regulatory staff and make
available their special field expertise. All these practices are commonly observed, e.g. in the
field of utility regulation, and there is no doubt that the information emanating from the
firm percolates throughout the regulators.
One condition for this mechanism to work is that the signal is soft and not hard infor-
mation. In traditional models of regulatory capture, it is often assumed that the regulator
produces either a verifiable signal perfectly correlated with the firm’s type or nothing. The
regulator has the discretion to disclose or not the signal produced if any but he cannot fal-
sify a signal. It is the discretion left to the regulator to report or not a signal which creates
room for regulatory capture. The soft capture model we develop in this paper discusses the
possibility for the regulated firm to manipulate the accuracy, content or informativeness of
16In fact, agencies sometimes actively solicit data from (likely biased) sources: “I am actually surprised
how often they [ministerial civil servants] ring me up looking for data. I would have assumed they should be
the ones who have it.” (Interview with lobbyist, Bernhagen and Bräuninger, 2005, p. 47)
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the information provided to the political principal by the regulator. Clearly enough this will
not be possible if the signal is hard information on the firm’s type. Soft capture thus can
only be envisioned if the accuracy of the signal produced by the regulator is non verifiable,
i.e. if the signal is soft information.
In practice, the information transmitted by the regulator to the principal is often based
on a mixture of public and private data. Naturally, a direct reproduction of the firm’s
information render the regulator’s lack of effort obvious. Thus, the softly captured regulator
indeed produces some regulatory substance (e.g. a revenue cap regime with parameters),
but biased to suit all or some of the firms. A regulatory task like the development of a cost
assessment methodology for a regulated industry is a typical example of soft information
that can be manipulated by the industry. On the contrary, the use of such a methodology
to effectively assess the cost of a regulated firm is more like an accounting exercise and it
can hardly be considered soft information. However, a softly captured regulator may accept
to use an industry-financed computer code to estimate grid construction costs in the actual
revenue-cap methodology (cf. Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 2003).
A model with soft capture
In this section, we develop the baseline model to integrate the possibility for the regulator
to be captured by the regulated. To do so, we suppose that before the regulator produces
his signal, the regulated firm can produce its own. We consider a stochastic production
technology for the firm: with probability x, the firm produces a noisy signal; with probability
1 − x, the firm produces nothing. The signal is produced by the firm at no cost.17 Given
that any additional information transmitted to the principal hurts the regulated industry
(Assumption 1), we consider that if the firm succeeds in producing a signal, the latter is
17The rent of the inefficient firm is, in any case, equal to zero. Thus, if producing a signal is costly for
the firm, only an efficient firm would produce it provided the cost exceeds the benefit. Considering costly
signals would not qualitatively change the results.
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totally non-informative, corresponding to µ = 1/2.18 The ability for a regulated industry to
produce a signal depends on many factors such as e. g. the existence of professional forums
or associations that can be used to produce and disseminate information that are favorable
to the industry. In section VI, we consider an endogenous probability x.
If the firm’s noisy signal is produced and transmitted to the regulator, he has the choice
between forwarding it to the principal or producing an original signal. As the regulator
receives the same payment w = m in both cases, the first option is obviously preferred by
the regulator. In the next sections we will discuss contracts between the principal and the
regulator aiming at preventing the regulator accepting industry input.
A crucial assumption here is that the principal is unable to observe the origin of a signal.
With probability x, the signal is totally uninformative and produced by the firm; with
probability 1− x, it is produced by the regulator and the signal has informativeness µ. The
principal thus updates her beliefs according to:






+ (1− x)µ) + (1− ν)(x
2
+ (1− x)(1− µ)) ,
ν˜2(x) = Pr(θ = θ|σ2) =
ν(x
2
+ (1− x)(1− µ))
ν(x
2
+ (1− x)(1− µ)) + (1− ν)(x
2
+ (1− x)µ) .
Signals are less informative when there is a possibility of capture (x > 0) but they remain
informative as long as x < 1. Formally, an increase in x has the following impact on the
preciseness of the signals:
Lemma 3 (i) ν˜1(x) is decreasing in x, ν˜1(0) = ν1 and ν˜1(1) = ν; (ii) ν˜2(x) is increasing in
x, ν˜2(0) = ν2 and ν˜2(1) = ν.
Proof: See Appendix B.
18In this formulation the signal produced by the firm is white noise but not biased. We treat the case of
biased signals as an extension in Section VI.
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After updating her beliefs, the principal designs a regulatory contract for the firm. This
contract is described in Equations (10) to (13) and obviously the welfare is lower. The
following Lemma characterizes the welfare in presence of soft capture.
Lemma 4 When the firm transmits a noisy message with probability x, the welfare evaluated
at the optimal contract is W˜ (µˆ) with µˆ = x
2
+ (1− x)µ < µ, ∀x > 0.
The proof is relegated to Appendix C.
The possibility of soft capture reduces the effectiveness of the regulation as the informa-
tiveness of the signal transmitted by the regulator is lower than µ. Notice that Lemma 4
implies that our model, where the firm produces a message that is white noise with prob-
ability x, could equivalently be interpreted as a model where the regulated firm is always
producing a message that is informative (µˆ ≥ 1/2), yet less so than the regulator-produced
signals (µˆ ≤ µ).
Even if the firm produces the information for free and is ready to transmit it to the regu-
lator, the political principal must still pay w = m to the regulator to obtain any information.
Indeed, if w < m, the regulator has no incentive to submit a signal unless it is transmitted by
the firm.19 When the threat of an independently produced signal is absent, the firm has no
incentive to disclose information at all. Hence, to benefit from a signal, potentially obtained
for free from the firm, the principal must still pay w = m to the regulator, conditionally on
reporting a signal. This nicely illustrates the rationale behind soft capture. It is the threat
of a more informative message that motivates the firm to disclose less precise information.
Should this threat disappear, the firm would no longer produce information.20 Hence, the
corresponding welfare under soft capture is W˜ (µˆ)−m.
19However, if the regulator does not submit the signal, the firm has no incentive to provide it to the
regulator in the first place. Interestingly, an underendowed regulator has no other option than to solicit the
firm for obtaining a free signal.
20This effect is analogous to the results obtained in lobbying models (Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992):
a lobbyist would only invest in costly information transmission provided the [decision-maker] enjoys a suffi-
ciently low cost of independent information acquisition, or else the message would be discarded by default
as non-informative.
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The cost of soft capture
The social cost of soft capture can be measured by the welfare loss associated with less
informative signals i.e., W˜ (µ)−W˜ (µˆ) > 0. By Lemma 1, the cost of soft capture is increasing
in µ as illustrated in Figure 2. Considering the cost of capture, adding a tier between the
political principal and the firm is no longer socially desirable for all values of µ ∈ [µ˜1, 1].
In Lemma 5, we update the conditions under which a regulator is socially valuable in the
presence of soft capture.
Lemma 5 If W˜ (1 − x/2) − W˜ (1/2) ≥ m, there exists µ˜2 ∈ [µ˜1, 1] such that if µ ≥ µ˜2, the
principal sets w = m and the regulator transmits a signal; otherwise it sets w = 0 and the














Figure 2: The cost of soft capture
There might be an additional inefficiency associated with capture if one considers that
the regulator’s information gathering expertise is endogenous and that it depends on the
regulatory endowment (staff, budget) decided by the principal in the first place. If we
consider that having the ability to produce a signal of quality µ costs the principal c(µ),
with c′ > 0 and c′′ ≥ 0, given the convexity of the welfare function (Lemma 1), the principal
would choose a lower endowment and hence a lower signal quality when capture is taken into
account, which creates additional inefficiencies.
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V A capture-proof mechanism
In order to benefit from the information gathering expertise of the regulator and guarantee
absence of capture, the principal must adapt both the level and the structure of the compen-
sation left to the regulator. In particular, the regulator could be made partially responsible
for the regulatory outcome, i.e. when better information leads to a more efficient regulatory
contract, the welfare gain should be shared with the regulator.21
To decentralize its objective, the principal should condition the wage paid to the regulator,
not on the delivery of a signal but on the regulatory outcome, i.e. the production or the
transfer level. A more informative signal makes the contracts (q
1
, t1) and (q2, t2) more likely
and (q
2
, t2) and (q1, t1) less likely. Hence, the regulator should reward the regulator for
the former and punish it for the latter. Denote by wi, wi, the wage paid to the regulator
conditional on a production level of q
i
, qi, i = 1, 2 and assume further that the regulator
is protected by limited liability imposing wi, wi ≥ 0. The capture-proof constraint for the
regulator is given by:
νµw1 + ν(1− µ)w2 + (1− ν)µw2 + (1− ν)(1− µ)w1 −m ≥
νµˆw1 + ν(1− µˆ)w2 + (1− ν)µˆw2 + (1− ν)(1− µˆ)w1 − (1− x)m. (18)
The left hand side of Equation (18) is the payoff to the regulator when it produces the
signal itself. The right hand side is the payoff when the regulator is captured. In this case,
the firm produces a noisy signal with probability x and the regulator a signal of quality µ
with the complementary probability (1− x). The overall signal quality is µˆ as the principal
21Incentive contracts for regulators are rarely used in practice (cf. Henderson and Tung, 2012) to prevent
capture. A more common solution is the multiplication and the diversification of the information sources
for the principal. Guerriero (2011) documents that rate reviews for regulated US electricity distributors
are organized as quasi-judicial hearings where all stakeholders (firms, customers...) have the opportunity to
bring information to the public utility commission (PUC). This yields rate reviews that are less dependent
on the regulator’s ability to gather information from the industry. The parties act as open advocates of
their interest and multiple sources of biased information may then mitigate the problem created by capture
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999).
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cannot distinguish who produced the message, the firm or the regulator. With soft capture,
the regulator saves on message production cost as it has to pay m only if the firm fails to
transmit a message, with probability (1− x).
Using the fact that µ− µˆ = x(µ− 1/2), we can simplify (18) to:
(µ− 1/2) (ν(w1 − w2) + (1− ν)(w2 − w1)) ≥ m. (19)
From this equation, it is clear that the principal should set w2 = w1 = 0 and the wages w1
and w2 are given by the binding capture-proof constraint (19).22
In the next Lemma, we compute the cost of preventing capture.
Lemma 6 For a capture-proof contract, the expected payment to the regulator is equal to
w˜ = (µm)/(µ− 1/2).
Proof: see Appendix D.
Lemma 6 shows that preventing capture is costly as the regulatory payment must be
inflated above m. Notice that except for this extra cost, preventing collusion does not lead
to any production inefficiencies. The welfare when the principal prevents capture is equal to
W˜ (µ)− w˜.
Comparisons
The principal is put in front of three possible choices: tolerating capture giving a payoff of
W˜ (µˆ)−m; preventing capture giving a payoff of W˜ (µ)− w˜ or abolishing the regulator giving
a payoff of W (1/2).
A comparison between preventing and tolerating capture can be expressed as follows.
22Notice that the contract with the regulator is designed prior to the regulatory contract (q, t). As a result,
commitment to the regulatory contract (ti, qi; ti, qi) after observing σi might be a concern. By deviating
slightly from the optimal second best contract, the principal saves on the regulator’s wage. Commitment
to the optimal regulatory contract requires that the regulator specifies a sufficiently large wage for out-of-






Tolerated capture dominates prevented capture if:
W˜ (µˆ)−m ≥ W˜ (µ)− w˜, (20)
or equivalently if:
w˜ −m ≥ W˜ (µ)− W˜ (µˆ). (21)
The left hand side of Equation (21) can be understood as the cost of preventing capture i.e.
the extra regulatory wage that must be paid to prevent capture. This cost is decreasing in
µ as ∂w˜/∂µ < 0. The right hand side is the cost of soft capture i.e. the welfare loss due to
less informative signals. By Lemma 1, this cost is increasing and convex in µ.
We can thus state:
Lemma 7 If W˜ (1) − m > W˜ (1 − x/2), there exists a µ˜3 ∈ (0, 1), such that the principal
prefers to tolerate capture for µ < µ˜3 and to deter capture for µ ≥ µ˜3. If W˜ (1) − m ≤
W˜ (1− x/2), the principal will always tolerate capture.
Proof: see Appendix E.
Combining all of our results, we can now characterize the tolerance for capture by the
principal at equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a non-empty set of values for µ such that soft capture will be
tolerated at equilibrium if µ˜2 < 1 and one of the following condition holds true:
1. W˜ (1)−m ≤ W˜ (1− x/2); in this case soft capture is tolerated for µ ≥ µ˜2 or,
2. W˜ (1) −m > W˜ (1 − x/2) and W˜ (1/2) > W˜ (µ˜2) − µ˜2mµ˜2− 12 ; in this case soft capture is
tolerated for µ ∈ [µ˜2, µ˜3].
Proof: see Appendix E.
As in Che (1995), the principal accepts the regulator to be softly captured by the firm in
equilibrium when the cost of preventing capture exceeds the benefits of improved regulation.
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This happens when the informativeness of the signal under soft capture is high enough in
absolute terms and relative to the accuracy of the regulator’s own-produced signal. We
summarize this point in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the probability x of producing a noisy signal for the firm increases, then the
parameter space in which soft capture is tolerated decreases.
Proof: see Appendix E.
Unsurprisingly, if the firm more often produces a noisy signal and the regulator accepts
it, the informativeness of the signal transmitted by the regulator decreases. Consequently,
the payoff to the principal decreases if she tolerates soft capture. At the limit, if the firm
produces the signal too often, µ˜2 will be higher than one and the principal will either prevent
capture or dismiss the regulator. This prompts for an analysis of the determinants of x.
VI Discussion
Endogenous signal quality
The mechanism of soft capture is based on the threat of having information produced (at
some cost) by the regulator. Potentially hurt by this information, the firm is ready to
preempt the regulator’s information gathering mission by offering noisy information as a
gift.
So far in our model, we have considered the information production technologies of the
regulator and the firm as exogenous. In this section, we discuss the possibilities of having
an endogenous signal quality. From the firm’s point of view, any information reduces the
collected rent (Assumption 1). Consequently, the firm has no incentive to provide informative
signals at all. Given the choice of x, the probability of sending a signal to the principal, the
firm would then set x = 1. Here, the regulator would always receive a noisy message from
the firm. If this message is invariably forwarded by the regulator, we have µˆ = 1/2 and the
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resulting welfare is W˜ (1/2) −m. This possibly leads to the collapse of the system as there
is no need for the principal to appoint a regulator at cost m for receiving uninformative
messages.23
Even in the case when the regulator is no longer used as an information gathering inter-
mediate, he may be of use in other roles, e.g. as a neutral enforcer of industry standards
or as a barrier to entry in protectionist settings. We leave these options for further work as
they would require a more elaborate market model.
As an alternative, the industry or the regulator may voluntary limit the acceptance of
industry input for regulation and then keep the message sufficiently informative to justify
an information gathering intermediate. We discuss the two alternatives in turn.
First, increasing x may be costly for the firm or the industry. As we said, the parameter x
depends on the industry characteristics: the number of firms, existence of industry lobbying,
congruence of interests between industry participants, etc., and producing information for
the regulator might be costly for the industry. Increasing x then brings both costs and
benefits. The importance of soft capture might then be limited by the cost of producing
information for the industry.
Second, the regulator may be refrained from accepting the industry output fearing dis-
missal if the messages are not sufficiently informative. Indeed, if the regulator transmits
white noise, he is useless. Then, to maintain his reputation and his job, the regulator may
limit the transmission of the firm’s produced signals. This would be particularly true if the
23The principal may however have statutory interests in keeping a regulatory authority. An example here is
the European Food Safety Agency, EFSA which relies on unpaid experts to guide the regulatory information
production in spite of a budget of 78 million euros (2013). On May 8, 2012, the Chair of the Management
Board of EFSA was asked to resign due to conflicts of interest. The former director immediately took
up a position in the International Life Sciences Institute, an industry organization founded by Coca-Cola,
Heinz, Kraft, General Foods, and Procter & Gamble. EFSA has established and maintains a heavy and
expensive system for controlling conflicts of interest at the individual level (limiting corruption risks). Yet,
the regulatory rule making is largely inspired by industry input to the extent of demonstrated plagiarism
in regulatory documents (Then and Bauer-Panskus, 2010, p. 9). The regulatory policy has been claimed
largely to coincide with the objectives of the industry that it is set to supervise, (Horel, 2013). Reacting
to the overt revolving door and mismanagement, the European Parliament postponed the discharge of the
2012 budget for six months, installed a two-year cooling-off period and instructed the agency to review its
internal organization (European Parliament, 2014).
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principal had the possibility of auditing the regulator periodically to investigate the source
of information and to penalize the regulator in the case of failure. External audit by the
political principal or public accountability policies24 may thus act as a disciplining device
and may limit the internalization of the firm’s information by the regulator.
These mechanisms may offset the incentives of the firm to flood the regulator with noisy
information.
Monetary bribes
We have shown that the possibility of soft capture inflates the compensation that the prin-
cipal must pay to the regulator in order to benefit from his information gathering expertise.
Without the threat of capture, the expected payment to the regulator is w = m. Taking
capture into account, the expected payment is w˜ > m. This compensation represents a
lower bound on the regulatory wage. Indeed, the firm may not only transmit information
to the regulator; it may, in addition, offer a monetary bribe for reporting the signal it has
produced. In this section, we calculate the cost of preventing collusion when both soft and
traditional capture are considered together.
Whether the regulator discloses a signal or not is a verifiable outcome on which the
payment to the regulator is made contingent. This mechanism assures the principal that
the firm cannot pay the regulator for withholding information (Tirole, 1986). The principal
observes the signal and her main concern is thus to prevent the transmission of noisy firm-
produced information.
24Implementations of public performance reviews which are not linked to monetary compensation schemes
do exist in certain jurisdictions such as Australia (see e.g. ITSR, 2014). In these reports, the regulator dis-
closes details regarding the outcomes, procedures, staffing, projects and priorities that permit an assessment
of the functioning of the authority. Similar reviews may also be performed by independent organizations,
see e.g. Renouf and Balgi (2013) on the enforcement performance of consumer protection regulators in Aus-
tralia. Note, however, that the disclosure of quantitative indicators of enforcement or claims processing may
provide a distorted image of regulatory performance since the substance of regulation, the rule making, is
less represented. Thus, although information disclosure may mitigate certain effects of capture, it does not
eradicate the risk of soft capture.
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For the firm, we can compute the benefit of capture using Equation (17):
∆θ(µ− 1/2) (q2 − q1) > 0. (22)
The firm may be willing to share part of this benefit with the regulator in return for accepting
the firm-produced signal. In this case, the firm and the regulator would be engaged in a side
contract to act against the interests of the principal. Let us assume that side contracting
between the regulator and the firm is costly and denote by 1 − k ≤ 1 the transaction cost
of side contracting. When the firm transmits 1$ to the regulator, the latter has k$ in his
pockets.25 This transaction cost captures the fact that the legal reward paid by the principal
to the regulator is not equivalent to the monetary bribe offered by the firm.
As only the firm of type θ is ready to bribe the regulator, the probability of having a
side contract is νx. When the principal designs the contract for the regulatory agency, she
must take into account that with probability νx the regulator faces an efficient firm ready to
bribe the regulator for not producing a signal and accepting the one it has produced. Thus,
for a collusion-proof contract, the principal must take into account that the highest bribe
potentially received by the regulator is:
B = νxk∆θ(µ− 1
2
) (q2 − q1) . (23)
In a capture-proof mechanism, the principal should take into account the opportunity
cost of the bribe. For this reason, the cost of preventing both soft and hard capture is equal
to w˜+B. The possibility of combining soft and hard capture further increases the cost of an
information gathering intermediate. Consequently, the parameter space where soft capture
is tolerated is extended.
25On the foundations of the transaction cost of side contracting, see Martimort (1999).
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Biased vs. noisy signals
The soft capture mechanism is based on the option for the firm to produce a piece of infor-
mation that is less informative than the signal potentially produced by the regulator. In our
model, we consider that the firm possibly sends a noisy but unbiased signal to the regulator:
there is no systematic cost padding in the signal produced by the firm but rather additional
noise compared to the regulator’s signal production technology. 26
Suppose that the firm produces a signal according to the following technology: The firm
produces a signal with probability x ≤ 1. Conditional on type θ = θ, the probability of
signal σ2 is µ; Conditional on type θ, the probability of signal σ1 is µ. So far, we considered
that µ = µ = 1
2
i.e. signals are white noise. Signals would be biased if µ < 1/2 < µ.
With biased signals, the scope for capture is even higher since the rents collected by the
efficient firm decreases in µ (see equation 17) and the inefficient firm has always a utility
normalized to the reservation level. Soft capture is thus even more of a concern when signals
are biased since the benefit of soft capture increases with the bias, i.e. the likelihood of
sending the high cost signal σ2 conditional on a low cost θ. Having said that, we can
replicate our analysis and show that soft capture is tolerated at equilibrium if the bias is
limited relative to the cost of monitoring. As a matter of fact, the condition for tolerating
soft capture does not depend on a possible bias in the signal but on the information content
of the signal relative to the cost of monitoring. Even biased signals must remain informative
for soft capture to be considered as a possible outcome.
26Unbiased but noisy signals correspond, for instance, to complex cost assessment methods that are hard
to interpret and use or technical regulation that is difficult to enforce. In case the regulator has access to all
relevant data for a regulatory ruling, the transmission of additional contradictory but irrelevant data induces




Accepting the conjecture that capture indeed exists and influences public authority decision
making and economic regulation enforcement, the critical question is to find its intrinsic
motivational functions in order to address it adequately. The existing literature is primarily
based on the hypothesis that regulators are driven by private monetary opportunism in the
sense of rent appropriation leading to remedies where collusive outcomes or “bribes” are
thwarted by delegation of the social welfare objective to the regulator. Still, although eco-
nomic regulation is omnipresent, both the precondition and the remedy are relatively rare
in empirical work from the Western hemisphere. Whereas incidents of outright corruption
of staff at regulatory agencies are reported, most agencies employ civil servants with ori-
gins and future in public service, who are exercising only limited discretionary power and
are subject to restrictions of due process and transparency. Still, many regulatory rulings,
albeit motivated, are clearly biased in favor of the regulated entities. Our model offers one
explanation to this apparent paradox by “soft capture” , where the firm acts as a co-producer
of information for the regulator, without imposing any agreement on the sharing of benefits
from the side of the firm nor commitment to use the information from the side of the regu-
lator. The resulting outcome is “soft” in the sense that it is voluntary, quality-adjusted and
flexible to the type of information and the abilities of the regulator to produce equivalent
information. Indeed, the political principal accepts this capture in equilibrium for the case
where the information submitted by the firm is of sufficiently high quality not to justify
further investments in independent information acquisition. In a context of stricter budget
balancing for governmental agencies, of fiscal competition among firms and countries and
of pressures for technically detailed regulation in e.g. utility regulation, one may plausibly
expect soft capture to be at work.
The findings in this work are not limited to the pure moral hazard setting for an effort-
averse regulator. They can also be interpreted as an alternative explanation for the “revolving
door” phenomenon in capture, based on the idea on “minimum squawk” (Leaver, 2009).
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Leaver (2009) finds evidence for correlation between falling propensity of regulators to open
rate-reviews in the case of observed cost decreases (i.e. rent extraction) and reductions in the
term limits of the regulator (i.e. reappointment stress). The model in Leaver (2009) is based
on a signaling behavior, where the regulator takes a risk to reveal its true type only through
a “tough” decision since the firm would then threaten to announce (“squawk ” ) the quality of
the decision . The empirical findings from US State Public Utility Commissions suggest that
less able regulators set more generous price caps when terms are shorter and that firms earn
higher rents when regulators serve short-term mandates. Comparing the “squawk” with
the pre-decision signal in our model and the cost of information as a decreasing function
of the time allocated, the outcome is consistent and confirms the intuition. The regulator
presented with convincing yet biased information on a given decision prior to undertaking an
investment in information acquisition, may hypothesize that the firm will carefully scrutinize,
oppose and appeal any decision that is not consistent with the information provided. The
cost of providing an information signal of the same or higher quality than that of the firm
may be prohibitive in the short run and the risk of subsequent failure great for the regulator
if faced by a renewal or career decision. Thus, one interpretation may be that the information
provision protects the regulator from two concerns: the political principal’s potential audit
of the basis for the regulatory enforcement and the firm’s legitimate review of the technical
quality of the rulings to which it is subject.
Soft capture also provides an intuitive instrument for regulatory capture by public or
inefficient firms characterized by low internal labor productivity, but potentially limited rent
extraction for shareholders available for conventional bribery. An overstaffed public firm is
a plausible producer of noisy information, it might also be able to use different channels
(branches of government, other regulators, political parties, unions etc.) in order to pass it
to the regulator. The social cost of soft capture in terms of undetected inefficiency in public
firms may of course be as detrimental as that resulting from excessive dividends paid to
private shareholders in efficient firms.
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Capture of regulatory agencies, or information gathering intermediaries in general, is a
composite phenomenon that empirically may be the result of a number of the explanatory
factors proposed in the literature (monetary bribes, revolving doors, political reputation
and prestige, etc.) in addition to or in combination with the relatively intuitive effort-
resource motivation that we advance in this work. Consequently, further empirical work
based on specific sectors, countries and legislations may be necessary to derive reliable policy
results that surpass the general guidelines found in contemporary work on good governance.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the simple“benchmarks” related to regulatory
endowments as a proxy of regulatory empowerment should be enriched with supplementary
analyses of the actual decision-making basis used by the regulators.
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A Complement to section III

























Given that the left hand side of Equation (A4) is greater than 1 for all µ ∈ [1
2
, 1], this con-
dition is always satisfied if S ′′(q1) ≤ S ′′(q2) or equivalently if S ′′′ ≥ 0 given that q2 ≥ q1.
(2) Proof of Lemma 1
Using the enveloppe theorem, implying that at the optimal contract ∂W˜/∂qi = 0, a
change in µ has the following impact on W˜ :
∂W˜ (µ)
∂µ
= (S(q2)− θq2)− (S(q1)− θq1). (A5)
Given that the surplus S(q)− θq increases in q for all q < S ′−1(θ), this expression is positive
as q1 < q2 < S ′−1(θ).








− (S ′(q1)− θ) ∂q1∂µ . (A6)


















which is positive, demonstrating the convexity of W˜ (µ).
B Proof of Lemma 3
For x = 0, the expressions for ν˜i and νi, i = 1, 2 are equivalent by definition. For x = 1, the
messages are totally noisy and the beliefs are equal to the priors, ν˜i = νi, i = 1, 2.
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C Proof of Lemma 4
In the soft capture case, we have Prob(σ1|θ = θ) = Prob(σ2|θ = θ) = µˆ = x/2 + (1 − x)µ.
The posterior beliefs of the principal are given by ν˜1 and ν˜2, or equivalently by the beliefs
ν1 and ν2, defined in Equations (4) and (5), were we replace µ by µˆ.
Given that, the optimal contract when there is soft capture is given by Equations (10)
to (13), replacing µ by µˆ and the welfare is given by W˜ (µˆ).
D Proof of Lemma 6
From Equation (19), we have:





The expected payment to the regulator is equal to:
µ (νw1 + (1− ν)w2) . (A9)
Combining the two equations, we proved the lemma.
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E Proofs of Lemma 7, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
(1) Proof of Lemma 7
Given that w˜ − m is decreasing and µ and W˜ (µ) − W˜ (µˆ) is increasing in µ, the equation
w˜ −m = W˜ (µ)− W˜ (µˆ) has at most one solution. Given that for µ → 1/2, W˜ (µ) → W˜ (µˆ)
and w˜ → ∞, the solution is necessarily above 1/2. The condition in the Lemma is the
condition for having µ˜2 < 1 i.e. W˜ (µ)− W˜ (µˆ) ≥ w˜ −m evaluated at µ = 1.
(2) Proof of Proposition 1
By Lemma 5, µ˜2 < 1 is a necessary condition to have tolerated soft capture at equilibrium.
(1) If W˜ (1)−m ≤ W˜ (1−x/2), then capture will never be prevented (Lemma 7) and tolerated
capture is optimal for µ ≥ µ˜2. (2) If W˜ (1)−m > W˜ (1− x/2), there exists µ˜3 < 1 such that
capture will be prevented for µ > µ˜3. The condition W˜ (1/2) > W˜ (µ˜2) − (µ˜2m)/(µ˜2 − 1/2)
is the condition to have µ˜2 < µ˜3 in which case tolerated capture is optimal for µ ∈ [µ˜2, µ˜3].
(3) Proof of Corollary 1
It is immediate to show that µ˜2 increases with x while µ˜3 decreases with x. Then, the
parameter space for which capture is tolerated necessarily decreases with x.
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